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Abstract: The conflict in Palestine has been the subject of numerous international 
investigative commissions over the past century. These have been dispatched by 
governments to determine the causes of violence and how to reach a resolution. 
Commissions both produce and reflect political epistemologies, the social processes 
and categories by which proof and evidence are produced and mobilized in political 
claim-making. Using archival and ethnographic sources, my analysis focuses on three 
investigative commissions—the King-Crane (1919), Anglo-American (1946), and 
Mitchell (2001) commissions—that show how “reading affect” has been a diagnostic 
of political worthiness. Through these investigations, western colonial agents and “the 
international community” have given Palestinians false hope that discourse and 
reason were the appropriate and effective mode of politics. Rather than simply reason, 
however, it was always an impossible balance between the rational and the emotional 
that was required. This essay explores the ways that affect as a diagnostic of political 
worthiness has worked as a technology of rule in imperial orders, and has served as an 
unspoken legitimating mechanism of domination.  
 
 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   2	  




In 1919 on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference that would divvy up the post-
Ottoman Middle East among European powers, US President Woodrow Wilson 
dispatched the King-Crane Commission to Syria (including Palestine). Its stated 
mission was to assess “the state of opinion there with regard to [the post-Ottoman 
Middle East], and the social, racial, and economic conditions” that obtained, in order 
to guide the Peace Conference in assigning mandates.1 According to the 
Commission’s announcement about itself, this was “in order that President Wilson 
and the American people may act with full knowledge of the facts in any policy they 
may be called upon hereafter to adopt concerning the problems of the Near East-
whether in the Peace Conference or in the League of Nations.”2  
 As part of that investigation, the Commission spent ten days of their 42-day 
tour in what was then considered “southern Syria,” or Palestine. There the American 
commissioners heard the same demands that most of the Arabs would present to the 
investigators in the rest of the region (what is today Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan): 
residents wanted independence in a multi-faith, united nation of Greater Syria, under 
the constitutional rule of a monarch, or, if they were forced to be governed by a 
mandatory state, they wished to be under its temporary tutelage.3 The majority did not 
want a mandate, because, as one commentator said, “our acceptance of foreign 
sponsorship would be an admission of our own inability to govern ourselves, and 
therefore deny us the opportunity at any point in the future to enjoy that right.”4 But if 
they were forced to have a mandate power, the overwhelming preference was for the 
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United States. The majority was also against the Zionist plan to establish a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine.5 Despite this uniform demand, which one of the commission 
staff, Albert Lybyer, noted, had been expressed with “manifest enthusiasm” in 
“countless earnest appeals” —the Great Powers granted the mandate of Palestine to 
the British, which ruled until Israel gained an independent state in much of the 
territory in 1948.6 
 Although Lybyer believed that they were expected to “’carry on a really 
scientific investigation,’”7 the records and reports of the King-Crane commission call 
that “scientific” basis into question. Even while international investigative 
commissions are explicitly dispatched to find the facts (Who has committed what 
abuses? What are the causes of the violence? How many people can the land sustain?) 
in order to come to conclusions and make recommendations that might set the 
conflicting parties—Arab and Zionist, Palestinian and Israeli—on a path to a solution, 
it is emotion that has consistently been their crucial evidence. Reading affect was 
their method. Affect, the natives’ “true” emotions and attitudes, are what the King-
Crane commission investigators were attuned to. And Palestinians’ feelings have been 
a focus of the many commissions that have examined the conflict in Palestine since 
then. What investigators have sought, recorded, and interpreted are the nationalist 
enthusiasms of the Palestinians or, conversely, the superficiality of their patriotism; 
they have measured their levels of sympathy, determined the causes of their anger, 
probed their pathos, and documented their suffering.  
 And yet, until recently, it has been the political principles, reasoned 
arguments, legal proofs, and rational calculations that Palestinians have concentrated 
on presenting to their examiners. For each and every commission that has summoned 
evidence from Palestinians—and there have been tens—they have organised their 
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arguments, corralled historical facts, collated statistics, presented photographic proof 
and offered eye-witness testimony. In these recurrent efforts, they have tried to 
present their political demands for liberation in ways that those with final say over 
their fate might hear and understand their position. Rationality and the language of 
law have been, after all, the rationale for colonial rule, making it incumbent upon the 
colonized to adopt these modes as the format for legitimate self-presentation.8 But 
more often than not, these demands have fallen on deaf ears. 
 This essay explores what happens when facts are called for but emotions are 
also sought, in the gap between the explicit and implicit rules of the game. It 
demonstrates how reading affect, as much as reason, is a technology of rule in 
imperial orders, and has served as an unspoken legitimating mechanism of 
domination. Throughout Palestinians’ history of seeking self-determination, their 
emotion has been identified, or found lacking, in ways that invalidate their political 
claims and disregard their political subjectivity. Commissions provide a particularly 
revealing lens onto the ways that affect as a barometer of political worthiness has 
worked within colonial orders over the last century. The Palestinian case is one of 
many in a long history of investigatory commissions propping up international 
regimes of inequality.9 
 But the power of this investigative method resides not only in the ways it is 
used to denigrate the nature of the colonized Other. Its maleficent potency resides in 
the persuasiveness of the more explicit claims to rule by reason, which has led the 
colonized to think it was rational debate and logical argument that held sway. The 
history of international commissions to Palestine shows these investigations to be a 
mechanism through which western colonial agents and “the international community” 
have given the colonized false hope that discourse and sensible argument were the 
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appropriate and effective methods of politics, when it was always an impossible 
balance between the rational and the emotional that was required.  
 Whereas much of the literature on colonial rule focuses on the role of emotion 
in delegitimizing claims to self-determination,10 I argue that the criteria according to 
which the fitness for self-rule was judged included a much more complex mix of 
reason and (that which was deemed) emotion. The demand for the correct emotional 
performance has always been part of the adjudication. Reviewing investigators’ 
claims to be able to access, read, interpret, and judge the non-discursive dimensions 
of the colonized’s subjectivity and stance—that is, their affective disposition—in the 
production of “facts” shows the slippery ways that “reading affect” has long been a 
diagnostic tool wielded by imperial powers.  
 Despite the fact that the criteria of political legitimacy are always shifting 
beneath them, Palestinians persist in engaging with commissions. There are many 
reasons for this, foremost among which is their perceived lack of alternatives.11 They 
cooperate with every investigation that presents a means to produce the evidence that 
might convince “the world” to end the occupation, and more recently, just ease the 
siege on Gaza. Israel, on the other hand, rarely cooperates with UN commissions, 
because the continuity of its settler-colonial project does not rely on it, and 
cooperation with commissions, the results of which they often do not agree with, 
would be interpreted as legitimizing those conclusions.12 There are also many 
political reasons that investigative commissions continue to be deployed, such as the 
need for governments and the UN to show that they are paying attention to the 
conflict. To address questions about what else motivates commissions and go beyond 
the obvious observations about their effects, however, the mechanism of commissions 
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and what they mean to the people involved has to be considered and situated within 
the history of colonialism.13  
 To show how sentiments have been present as much more than a “halo” for 
the experts’ work, my analysis focuses on three investigative commissions:14 the 1919 
King-Crane commission, the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry that 
investigated the situation of Jews and Palestinians at the end of World War II, and the 
Mitchell Commission, which involved the US, EU, Norway and Turkey in examining 
the causes of the second intifada in 2001.15 What is so striking a feature of these three 
commissions is the centrality of forensic reading of Palestinian emotions; it is taken 
for granted that commissioners can read the Arabs’ feelings, and it is assumed that 
this is relevant to their task. While the political context and dominant governing 
institutions have changed shape throughout this period, and the kinds of people called 
on to represent the Palestinians have shifted from notables to NGOs, and although the 
value assigned to different emotional states and the feelings deemed important 
changes over time, analysis of these commissions makes clear that reading affect has 
been a fundamental part of political epistemology, not only in the early stages of 
colonialism and in the late colonial period, but also well beyond.16 These 
commissions did not change political actions or attitudes among leaders like US 
President Truman or others. Palestinians’ performances of affect and their well-
communicated worthiness may not have had political effect on the westerners judging 
them. But investigators’ claims to be able to read Palestinians’ “true” emotions and 
intentions were a basis on which commissioners and politicians could justify their 
recommendations, including refusals of Palestinian rights and political entitlements. 
 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSIONS 
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Putting Political Epistemologies to Work 
 Among the numerous investigative commissions to Palestine, in addition to 
those I analyze here, there have been British investigations under the mandate, 
including the Shaw and Peel Commissions that reported on the Zionist-Arab 
disturbances in the 1920s and 1930s. The UN has also spear-headed many fact-
finding missions, including the 2009 Goldstone Commission and the Independent 
Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, to name but a few.17 Each of these 
commissions consisted of a group of experts of one kind or another, including 
academics, lawyers, and military men. As with most commissions in the world, a 
government, coalition of governments, or supranational body charged each of them 
with investigating a specific set of circumstances;18 in Palestine these have usually 
been prompted by a period of intensified violence. 
 These investigations are analytically useful for uncovering the logics of 
political orders. They often come on the heels of moments of rupture in an ideological 
formation caused by violent crisis. They invite argument, conducted through multiple 
media, about the nature and bases of political relations, and they bring international 
conflicts, as well as government action (or inaction) and policy deliberation, into 
wider public view. Commissions attract an audience, albeit temporary, and bring a 
public into being around the various texts that a commission produces (including 
testimonies, videos, speeches, and the commission reports themselves).19  
 Commissions both produce and reflect “political epistemologies,” the social 
processes and categories by which proof and evidence are produced and mobilized in 
political claim-making.20 As such, commissions also give a special view onto the 
changing justifications for colonial and other forms of managing conflict, and onto the 
assumptions underlying how adequate political justifications are determined and 
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asserted. Each investigation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is shaped by and reflects 
systems of political thought and political trends according to which Palestinian 
worthiness to self-rule has been argued and evaluated.  
 The manner in which scholars and others discuss and analyze commissions is 
itself part of the process of producing and maintaining confusion about what they do, 
and obscures the functioning of political epistemologies. Most commentary 
reproduces the claim that government policies and plans are based on logic and facts, 
a notion upon which commissions are premised.21 Throughout the centuries of world 
history in which investigative commissions have been a tool of governance—some 
say the Domesday Book of 1086 was the first such commission22—claims to the 
thoroughness, accuracy, and objectivity of these investigations, and the balanced and 
unbiased nature of their investigators, have usually been asserted by those involved.23 
Governments (and occasionally universities and professional associations) set up 
commissions to investigate a variety of phenomena, including violent events, policies, 
war crimes, famine, histories of national conflict, and race relations, among others. 
Even with this variety, scholarship and public discourse about investigative 
commissions consistently assess them on similar grounds—of accuracy, objectivity, 
and results—that accord with the self-understanding of commissions themselves. 
 There is no consensus on how to evaluate commissions or measure their 
impact, since they have vastly differing forms, effects, and scholarly interpretations.24 
Commissions can be “a first step in law creation,” viewed as an abdication of 
governmental responsibility, seen as a “pacifying mechanism” and a method to block 
reform, or recognized as a catalytic inciting controversy.25 More critical analyses try 
to determine the bias of investigators, the political effects of commission reports, or 
unravel the political chicanery and machinations that infiltrate commission work.26 In 
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many cases these assessments are analyzed from the perspective of present political 
contests.27 
 The political nature of commissions is also something regularly remarked on 
across all national cases, with UN commissions coming under particularly sharp 
critique for the apparent bias that skews results.28 The regular use of commissions to 
exonerate government policies and actions is also apparent in diverse historical cases 
and locations. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, provided “an official 
narrative of the events that gave rise to the ‘war on terror’” that helped justify it in the 
United States. The Royal Commission Report of 1834 supported the rescinding of 
welfare for the poor in England.29 The Iran-contra Hearings, a different kind of 
spectacle, constituted “a civic ritual” in which public representatives could “pass 
judgment on the legal and moral status of actions taken in the highest office in the 
land,” but in the end it fed into “collective forgetting” of the scandal and Oliver North 
emerged relatively unscathed.30 
 Another typical observation about commissions is that their recommendations 
are usually “laboriously arrived at and then customarily ignored.”31 Even while 
criticizing them for producing no useful results, however, this sort of critique remains 
within the logic and reasoning of the inquiry commissions’ terms of reference. It 
starts from an assumption that all the hard work, time, and expense that governments 
invest in their inquiries should not be ignored. Such arguments presume that 
investigative commissions seek facts, and that the processes involved in finding the 
facts bear a significant relationship to the commission’s results, or should do so. They 
accept that the commission of inquiry’s goal is to come to conclusions from those 
facts, and improve some political situation based on its recommendations. From there, 
the quality of the investigative processes, the credibility of the facts and fact-finding 
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personnel, and the nature of the deductions and resultant recommendations are then 
judged, and often found lacking.  
 Although it is uncommon for studies to consider commissions beyond their 
own terms of reference and policy effects, a few have analyzed commissions from a 
more Foucauldian perspective as fora in which forms and producers of knowledge are 
legitimated or discredited.32 They have looked at commissions for what they reveal 
about “ruling orders,” to understand how the states that dispatch them conceive of 
“questions of sovereignty, citizenship, and territorial division,” to determine how 
commissions “create the categories they purport only to describe,” and thereby 
support structures of domination and political exclusion.33 These studies are interested 
in the commission as a tool of ruling orders. But they tend to approach this problem 
through trying to understand the rulers; they base their analyses on readings of 
commission reports with an eye trained on the rhetorical strategies and the discursive 
constructions of social categories by the dominant.34  
 In contrast, my analysis starts from a question about how the ruled try to speak 
to the rulers. Exploring the micro-interactions of investigator and investigated through 
archival research, testimony, memoirs, and personal papers, and through ethnographic 
interviews with people involved in these commissions, tells us more about the 
workings of political hegemony from the perspective of the dominated, while 
revealing much about the interplay between political epistemologies of ruling orders 
and the rights claims of subjects.35 This approach helps us understand the mechanisms 
by which the ruled are led to misunderstand the nature of the regime maintaining their 
subordination. Commissions hold up the promise of reasonableness in policy-making. 
They are framed in a way to lead interested observers to believe that the perceptions 
and concerns of those groups that are under scrutiny will be rationally considered. 
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Using the language of evidence, proof, and objectivity, and drawing on the tools of 
law and sometimes positivist social science, they invite interested parties into public 
discussion to prove themselves reasonable political subjects. The irony is that it is the 
commissioners’ presumed emotional perspicacity, their claim to be able to read the 
affect of the investigated, not their reasonable considerations, that has helped justify 
their rejection of Palestinians’ political demands.  
 
THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION, 1919 
 In US President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech before 
Congress in 1918, he advocated the equality of nations, consent of the governed, and 
self-determination as principles for political arrangements after WWI.36 The hope that 
his proclamations gave to the colonized was an important part of the context of the 
King-Crane Commission, and helped shape the terms of the debate with the Arabs 
while the League of Nations was in formation.37 Arab spokespeople drew on Wilson’s 
language of justice as a validating pillar for their own political demands.38 One of the 
Palestinian delegations to the King-Crane Commission asked that the Peace 
Conference meeting in Paris at the time “defend the right of general humanity”39 in 
line with Wilson’s liberal principles. Prince Faisal, who was one of the Arabs’ 
emissaries to the Peace Conference and main Arab leader in Greater Syria, said that 
he could be “confident that the [Great] Powers will attach more importance to the 
bodies and souls of the Arabic-speaking peoples than to their own material 
interests.”40  
 Although there were expressions of cynicism about what the King-Crane 
Commission was really up to, many among those writing about the Commission’s 
activities at the time seemed to accept its goals in good faith.41 In a protest letter to 
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British General Allenby in 1918, the Muslim-Christian Association, a Palestinian 
civic club, asked rhetorically, “So can the destiny of Palestine be determined before 
taking the opinion of people?” “We don’t think so,” was its buoyant response.42 The 
King-Crane commissioners had publicly assured the Arabs that “the Allied powers 
did not undertake war to expand the extent of their possessions, but to protect justice 
and that which was right, over power and oppression.”43 The principles of peace and 
justice between nations, which Woodrow Wilson was championing, encouraged the 
belief among Palestinian nationalists that they could prove, through reasoned 
argument and proper political performance, that their nationalism deserved a state. 
The King-Crane commission elicited answers to the explicit question “What kind of 
government do you want?” Their Arab respondents also answered an implied 
question, “What kind of nation do you claim to be?”  
 So how did the King-Crane Commission attempt to take the opinion of the 
Arab people?44 The Commission was to consist “of men with no previous contact 
with Syria.” This would, Wilson believed “convince the world that the [Peace] 
Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a 
settlement.’”45 Regardless of how organized and “scientific” the Commission actually 
was, the language and form of objectivity, science, and fair representation appears 
repeatedly throughout the Commission’s final report. They were clearly anxious to 
present themselves as impartial observers, and to produce a report that appeared 
objective. In one instance, their actions were literally a performance, complete with 
costume. An Arabic language newspaper reporting on the investigators’ visit “noticed 
that some of the members [of the King-Crane Commission] wore on their arms a 
piece of cloth with the [Arabic] word meezan” [scales, balance] on it, pointing to the 
fact that “justice” was a guiding principle of their work.46 
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 The mass of documents assembled by the commissioners shows evidence of 
their investment in the aesthetics of authoritative knowledge.47 What counted as data 
was that which could be counted: expressions of opinion by representatives from a 
representative number of groups. They used the scientific forms of statistics and 
tables to constitute social groups, and they determined how many petitions and 
delegations were needed to be representative through simple assertion. Maps of 
religious and “racial distributions” were also integral to the report.48 
 They also affirmed the representative nature of their findings by showing how 
many different kinds of groups they met with. These were categorized according to 
political type, economic group, and religious affiliation. Muslims were subdivided 
into Sunni, Shi’ite, and, interestingly, “Moslem Ladies.”49 
 It was not only the Commissioners who were concerned to represent their 
work as being objective and truly representative, of course. The Arab leadership who 
helped organize the Commission’s visit also strived to present itself in a way to 
enhance the credibility of their position. And here we get to something of the double 
bind in which the Arab representatives found themselves. How could they leverage 
popular sentiment and prove that their position was representative of the population as 
a whole, demonstrate publicly that this was a national population deserving of an 
independent nation, but at the same time, not let their people come across as unruly 
crowds?50   
 For one, political groups and the central Arab Government organized a large 
petition campaign. The Commission tallied over 90,000 signatures on the 1,863 
petitions. Emir Feisal also spoke the language of impressive numbers, declaring to the 
Commission that he was “authorized to represent [the people] by official documents 
containing over three hundred thousand signatures.”51  
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 In addition to petitions, demonstrations were staged throughout Syria and 
Palestine. Arabic news articles from the time reflect a population concerned with 
proving themselves “civilized,” “mature,” and “intelligent” in front of the 
commissioners, to prove that they deserved an independent state. In order to prove 
this, they held “orderly demonstrations showing their national sentiments and 
desires.”52 What this amounted to, then, were quick quiet demonstrations. And here 
we get to the problem of emotions.   
 The problem for the Arab government, which was trying to prove to the 
democratic western powers their fitness for self-rule, was the need to show a certain 
kind of public that could demonstrate the appropriate sensibility: a unified public that 
was “on message” with a single slogan; a public that was actually in public, as a 
backdrop to the message, demonstrating that the population was on board with the 
independence plan; but also a public that was in public without being an unruly mob. 
 And so it was. An observer describing the demonstrations in a local newspaper 
wrote that it was perfect: “quiet, without tumult, no speeches—yet through its silence 
the demonstration announced the advancement of the people.”53 These quiet 
demonstrations were a physical embodiment of the orderly modernity of the Arab 
nation, and their status, therefore, as deserving an independent state.54 They believed 
that presenting their unity in a disciplined form was required to convince the 
Commission. “It is imperative that we unite our voices in the call for complete 
autonomy,” a commentator urged in a local newspaper. In this article, entitled “At the 
Doors of the Examination,” he wrote that their voices, united in a demand for 
autonomy, would “push the commission and [peace] conference to view our self-
sufficiency and suitability for rule, as the nation that succumbs to slavery and 
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humiliation will never earn respect.”55 Presentation of a unified voice was itself 
assumed to be an index of political worthiness. 
 The well-publicized Article 22 of the League of Nations also formed part of 
the discursive framework shaping the terms of the debate.56 The League of Nations 
insisted that a mandate was necessary to train the Arabs into independence. Article 22 
spelled out the League’s new form of colonial power in the shape of Mandatory 
“tutelage.”57 Many Arab commentators refused Article 22.58 They refused to be 
categorized as, “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world,” as the League defined them.59 The Arabs responded 
to the hierarchy of development that was institutionalized in the League of Nations’ 
division of A, B, and C Mandates. Although the Arabs were designated “peoples not 
yet able to stand by themselves,” they (including Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and 
Transjordan, and Iraq) were at the top of the list among the “A” Mandates: people 
who were “provisionally recognised as independent,” but would receive “the advice 
and assistance of a Mandatory in its administration until such time as it is able to 
stand alone.”60 The Palestinians asserted that their people were already standing. They 
were being educated in America and Europe, delegations told the Commission, so 
they had among them all the professions necessary for producing a functioning 
country, from farmer to pharmacist, mechanic to mathematician, making them “ready 
with all the necessary tools for independence.”61  
 But there was no convincing some. William Yale, one of the commission 
advisers, doubted the possibility of developing a Syrian national spirit. He insisted 
that “this liberal movement [currently] was too feeble… to rally to their support the 
ignorant, fanatical masses which are swayed by the Ulemas [religious scholars] and 
the Young Arab Party” (an Arab nationalist group).62  
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 And this despite all of the assurances by Feisal, the Arab leader, that what the 
Arabs wanted was a non-sectarian nation-state, and despite all the Arab delegations’ 
assurances to the Commissioners that minority rights—in this case Christian and 
Jewish—would be protected. The long presence of Arabs in Palestine and their 
demographic majority was, for Arab commentators, argument enough against the 
Jewish claim to Palestine as a national home. Jewish demands for rights to the land 
“based on colonization of the area from a different century” was, in their view, 
unreasonable, given that “by that logic this would mean that Arabs could claim Spain, 
or the Romans or Greeks [could] claim anywhere they were,” as some wrote in a 
letter of protest.63 Judaism was a religion, not a nation.64 The Christian-Muslim 
Association wrote in a letter to the Military Ruler in 1918 that they had no “doubt that 
the civilized world [would] not permit that which is not reasonable.”65 
 But William Yale, the technical adviser on Southern Syria, was skeptical that 
there was “any genuine sentiment of nationalism in Syria,” and he felt “a distinct note 
of pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.” Religious sentiment, if it was Muslim religious 
sentiment, could not be a valid basis for national unity. And he deemed those Arabs 
who rejected the League’s Article 22 to be a “fanatical element” fueled by their 
“profound anti-western feeling.”66 Yale said that it was by “a clever, well organized 
and thorough propaganda the Moslems of Palestine and Syria have been united on a 
program which superficially has every sign of being Syrian nationalism, but which is 
basically Islamic.”67   
 It is not just that Arab emotion was an important element of the equation that 
had to be performed for their assessors, but it had to be performed correctly, to be 
calibrated as properly national and not improperly supra-national, Islamic fanatical—
or boring. The fact that the petitions were so uniform, so clear in their requests for 
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independence, indicated to Yale that the masses supported nationalism with no 
understanding of it. Not only did the perceived lack of nationalist emotion disqualify 
the Palestinians, so too did the emotional pull of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. 
Emotion was expected to be spontaneous, but not if it spilled over territorial 
boundaries pulling the Arabs in the “direction of an Arab Moslem Confederation,” 
which is where Yale believed the Arabs’ ambitions pointed.68  
 Maybe the Arabs’ demonstrations were too orderly for Yale. In a report about 
the Commission shortly after its conclusion he wrote: “the demands and wishes of the 
Syrians and the form of proclamations, declarations, petitions, etc. were cut and dried 
to the point of boredom.”69 Yale believed nationalism to be “a psychological force,” 
and a matter to be judged according to the “intensity of emotional reaction.”70 It 
depended on people accepting group ideas “as a political philosophy” that “stirs their 
emotions so profoundly that loyalty to this philosophy becomes the dominant loyalty 
over-riding… all others.”71 Perhaps the Arabs’ quietness did not provide for him 
enough evidence of true nationalist spirit amongst the people. One wonders whether 
the colonized could ever get the balance between nationalist enthusiasm and civilized 
behavior just right. 
It is likely that, for Yale, no performance could have convinced him of the 
Arabs’ sincere nationalism, given his orientalist views of “the Near Easterner,” who 
he believed had “not fully emerged from the middle Ages.”72 (These beliefs were 
shared by George Montgomery, another on the King-Crane team).73 It is also the case 
that Yale’s views, which he recorded in a dissenting report from King and Crane, 
were not central in the final commission report.74 But the point is that he could 
dismiss Arab political claims on the grounds of their emotions as he interpreted them.  
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Yale’s savvy interpretations of emotion served two purposes: it verified his 
expertise, and, by disqualifying the Arab nationalist aspirations, bolstered the 
legitimacy of western claims to rule.75 To Yale, the coherence of the Syrian petitions 
with which the Commission had been “incontinently inundated,” their orderly 
submission, and the Arab demonstrations lacked a spontaneity that might have 
indexed a more convincing, emotion-bound spirit.76 The Arabs were responding to 
Wilson’s statements and the language of the League of Nations, which, as Jane 
Cowan has shown, disallowed “unruly linguistic behavior” and censored violent, or 
passionate, expression.77 So while the Arabs were concentrating on demonstrating 
their reasonable, civilized nature and organized unity, it seems they needed to put on a 
more demonstrable display of the proper emotion. 
Politics, Emotion, and Affect 
 The variable uses of emotion, their deployment in political projects, their 
range of effects on political actors, have long been evident to anthropologists and 
others. Emotions are political and cultural,78 important to social unity, mobilization, 
and conflict management,79 and part of economic rationality.80 Although affect, rather 
than emotion, has been the trending focus in more recent anthropology,81 the 
definitional question remains. What distinguishes affect from emotion, sensibility 
from sentiment in lived experience and analytical approach is not always very clear. 
There are also debates about the methodologies required in the study of 
emotion/affect. As Pinch points out, “the relationships among a historical period’s 
talk about feeling, people’s experience of feeling, and the historical meanings of 
feelings may not always be obvious.”82 There are two key issues that could 
productively be distinguished to move these discussions along: one, to recognize that 
the question of how to trace the ways in which emotions are cultivated or affect is 
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experienced is also a methodological one that must be answered with relation to the 
specific kinds of material being analyzed; and two, there is a distinction between 
affect and claims about affect (including claims to be able to judge affect).  
 The problem of how and whether scholars as observers can make 
determinations about what affect is and what affects (or emotions) are actually at play 
in any given interaction or social phenomenon must necessarily return to the question 
of mediation, and demands sustained reflection on “the possibility of knowing 
through feeling.”83 How does affect become apparent to the analyst? Whereas earlier 
studies of emotion have considered this more explicitly, scrutinizing language, 
culture, or ideology as the mediating frameworks, some of the more recent 
approaches to affect, especially those coming out of cultural studies or social 
geography, tend to leave this issue under-examined, assuming an ability to recognize 
affect when scholars see, feel, or notice it. 
 Here is where our sensitivity to the imbrication of definition, method, and 
theory must be heightened. If affect is defined as “a non-conscious experience of 
intensity,” how does the historian or ethnographer identify it?84 We live, learn, and 
communicate through symbols. If affect is that which is in excess of the symbolic, as 
some claim,85 then how can it be data or evidence for our scrutiny as outside 
observers? Emotion, on the other hand, the culturally mediated, feeling-part of the 
social that is evident in discourse about it, is more amenable to analysis. So too is any 
discourse or system of knowledge production that claims to offer evaluations of 
affect. 
 What some streams of “affect theory” claim to be trying to get hold of is an 
aspect of human experience and social life that seems to exist and have its effects in a 
realm that is not totally encompassed by discourse; affect is distinct from descriptions 
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of it, distinct from, if not totally untouched by, culture. “Excess,” “intensity,” and 
“virtuality” are some of the words affect theorists typically use to try to convey this 
uniqueness.86 For some, affect is an excess beyond language or, perhaps, reason; a 
bridge that spreads across the binaries of individual and social, person and 
environment, mind and body.87 Affect is an “intensity” in that it is something felt and 
noticed beyond the ordinary humdrum of daily life.  
 To be sure, what colonial officials and commissioners are doing in their 
readings of natives’ hearts and minds is something very different from what the affect 
theorists are up to, but there is a common thread. For the imperialists as much as the 
theorists, affect always means something that is at least partially hidden – hidden 
from reason, language, but somehow available to them to read, decode, and build 
conclusions on. This provides two forms of power: one is the freedom to interpret and 
assert, and another is the claim to an extraordinary ability to read beneath the surface 
of things that gives a privileged access to truth.    
 Because affect is veiled, unnamed, inexplicit, for those who would find and 
name it, the scope for interpretation and assertion is wide indeed. The vagueness of 
the immanent-that-is-affect is precisely what allowed Yale to be bored by what, in 
Lybyer’s view, was the Arabs’ enthusiasm and earnestness.88 Perhaps they saw what 
they wanted to see.  
 Yale was particularly concerned to present himself as the hard-nosed colonial 
“expert,” the one who could read into the hearts of the local people and discover the 
superficiality of their political commitment to the nation. He distinguished himself 
from the political naïfs like Lybyer who he was forced to work with, and remained 
unswayed by idealistic liberalism.89 His contact with “the peasants of the Near East” 
is what allowed him to understand the true nature of their “passionate attachments” to 
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their villages and families, and to see that these affections did not extend across the 
unified nation that the Syrian elite were asking for.90 The expert is the one who can 
extract the truth of the natives’ motivations and intentions lurking underneath their 
stated commitments, aims and goals.91 Attesting to his own “real love for Syria,” Yale 
defended his conclusions about the absent Arab nationalism by declaring his “sincere 
hope to see Syria eventually a united country with a genuine national spirit.”92 
Against his own sincerity, love, and hope, he contrasted the destructive religious 
intentions and motivations of those demanding independence. His was the power to 
distinguish the real from the professed, the capacity to see through the murky realm of 
alleged emotion to the true feelings and dangerous intentions within.93 
 My argument, then, is not in line with the call of the “affective turn” to attend 
to the “autonomic processes” and “‘visceral’ forces” below the threshold of 
consciousness and meaning. The noble intention of this scholarship to make up for a 
history of social theory in which, supposedly, “philosophers and critics have largely 
neglected the important role our corporeal affective dispositions play in thinking, 
reasoning, and reflection” is valid enough.94 But my concern lies elsewhere, with the 
fact that affect (and specifically, the claim to be able to interpret it) has been a critical 
instrument in consolidating regimes of power and denying rights to the dispossessed. 
Commissions to Palestine can prompt questions about how the false claim of colonial 
and imperial powers to govern through reason and value rationality above all has been 
understood by the colonized. Uncovering how and why political contenders—and not 
only we social analysts—recognize and misrecognize the place of sensibilities and 
sentiments within political reasoning provides one key to understanding the 
hegemony of international management of various conflicts, and the persistent failure 
of Palestinians to achieve statehood.95 
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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY, 1945-1946 
 For decades, Palestinians have been trying to argue that a political solution is 
required to remedy their situation. But since World War II they have been up against 
the particularly poignant humanitarian and emotional claims of the Zionist movement, 
which sought to make Palestine a homeland for the Jews. In my next case, the Anglo-
American Committee of Enquiry, the Palestinians are once again subject to a forensic 
reading of their emotions, and once again the affective regime shifts with the 
introduction of new criteria and the new mediating factor of the Holocaust. The 
colonial demand for the balance between emotion and political reason becomes 
impossible to meet, now held out of reach by the traumatic historical experience of 
the Jews.  
 Earl G. Harrison, who Truman had sent in 1945 to study the condition of 
displaced persons in Europe, wrote a report that “stirred Truman’s sympathy for the 
Jews and alerted him to an issue that would arouse the political as well as the 
humanitarian emotions of the American public.”96 This led to the formation of the 
Anglo-American Committee, which was to “examine the question of European Jewry 
and to … review the Palestine Problem in light of that examination.”97 Truman, who 
continually expressed compassion for refugees to his Jewish constituency, had urged 
the American chair of the Anglo-American Committee to produce a report that would 
recommend “an affirmative program to relieve untold suffering and misery.”98 The 
Committee was formed, then, through what we might call, following Peter Redfield 
and Erica Bornstein, a humanitarian structure of feeling, “a cluster of moral 
principles, a basis for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action.”99  
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 For their part, the Palestinians persisted with the political logic of their case. In 
their presentation to the Anglo-American Committee, they explained their opposition 
to the Zionists’ plan to turn Palestine into a Jewish state. Their own position, they 
said, was based on democratic principles: “the right of a majority to decide its 
political destiny.”100 Among the Palestinians who prepared a presentation to the 
Committee, there was a clear concern with presenting hard evidence, and keeping 
emotional expressions in check. In the memoirs of Yusif Sayigh, a Palestinian 
economist who contributed research for the Palestinian written submission to this 
Commission, he discusses how his input was shaped. He had been asked to prepare a 
report assessing the extent and nature of Arab land holdings. When Sayigh wrote his 
contribution, he only had a BA degree—he later went on to get a PhD in political 
economics from Johns Hopkins and became a full professor at the American 
University of Beirut. But at the time, he noted in his memoirs, his English “wasn’t all 
that good,” so he had a friend edit his paper.101 Sayigh’s British friend “took away all 
the things that showed anger or emotionalism.” These strong feelings, which he said 
appeared in his writing, were prompted by his discoveries about the “awful things, 
about the injustice, the eviction of hundreds of families from the Esdraelon plain [also 
known as the Jezreel or Zir’een Valley]. Twenty-three villages were evicted.”102 
Sayigh recounts that his friend told him, “’Calm down, you’re writing for Britishers 
and for Americans. If they see this you’ll lose the strength of your point.’”103 He 
persuaded Sayigh “to tone things down here and there.”104 But the crafting and 
drafting of the appropriate tone could do little to budge the order as it existed, with the 
suffering Jews the paramount victims overshadowing all other considerations.  
 Despite the efforts of Sayigh and his colleagues to avoid any expression of 
anger that might suggest that their facts were not credible or were biased, members on 
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the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were mostly unimpressed by the Arabs’ 
case. Evan Wilson, a secretary to the American members of the Committee and 
Palestine desk officer in the US Department of State, wrote that the Arabs’ testimony 
was badly organized and bespoke their lack of leadership.105 Echoing Yale’s 
complaint about the boring uniformity of the petitions submitted to the King-Crane 
Commission, Wilson dismissed the Arab presentations to the Anglo-American 
Committee as being “mostly a repetition of the standard Arab argument that Palestine 
was Arab and the Jews were interlopers.”106 Although the Arabs had long based their 
arguments on the principle of self-determination proposed by Woodrow Wilson at the 
end of WWI, the Americans and British did not interpret the Arab argument as a 
principled and consistent political stance, but rather as “rigid and unimaginative.”107   
 The investigators did have a begrudging appreciation for one speaker, Albert 
Hourani, who was an Oxford-educated scholar whose family was from Lebanon. He 
was working for the Arab Office, a small diplomatic and public relations team for the 
Palestinians, which was organized to lobby the American government and western 
public opinion. The Arab Office produced the Palestinians’ main presentation for the 
British and American investigators. According to eminent Palestinian historian, Walid 
Khalidi, who had once been a young member of staff at the Arab Office, Albert 
Hourani and his Oxford training set the tone of the Arab Office’s work. Khalidi 
explained to me their approach: “The idea was to not be polemical,” he said. “But to 
be factual. To be documented. To have supporting evidence for whatever you said. To 
be tough without being vulgar or extravagant.”108 They had a conscious awareness of 
the fact that how emotions of different sorts were expressed “provided both cultural 
and legal ‘proof’ of who one was, where one ranked in the colonial order of things,” 
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as Ann Stoler puts it.109 Khalidi said they also tried to put themselves “in the shoes of 
the other side.” But, it would turn out, their empathetic efforts were off target. 
 The commissioners conceded that Hourani “did a brilliant job of presenting 
the Arab side, comparable to Weizmann’s for the Jewish.”110 But the force of his 
testimony was weakened, his credibility tarnished, his morality called into question, 
because he fell short on expressing a crucial emotion: sympathy. When one of the 
Commissioners questioned him on the Arabs’ demand that Jewish immigration to 
Palestine stop, the commission’s secretary reported, “he would not agree to the 
admission of a single additional Jew to Palestine—not even the aged and infirm 
among the displaced persons.”111 Indeed, the Arab Office stance was clear: the doors 
of Europe and America should be opened to the victims of the European war, not the 
politically fragile Holy Land.112 
 What struck the Committee was “this completely intransigent stand,”113 rather 
than Hourani’s argument. Hourani had tried to explain that sympathy for the displaced 
Jews of Europe could not be addressed as if they existed in a political vacuum: “it is 
unhappily impossible,” he said, “to consider the question of immigration simply on 
humanitarian grounds … The question of immigration into Palestine must be seen in 
its general political framework.”114 This point was subsequently echoed in the 
response to the report submitted by The Institute of Arab American Affairs. Signed by 
Faris S. Malouf and John Hazam, the memorandum asserted that “no solution of the 
humanitarian aspect of the 'displaced' and 'persecuted' Jews can be discussed, let alone 
solved, without taking into consideration the wider political aspects of Palestine and 
the Arab world.” They encouraged compassion for victims of the Nazis, but not if it 
violated “the inalienable rights of the Arabs.”115  Hourani and the Arab Office 
presented these views at a time when some Palestinians (although a decreasing 
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number) believed coexistence with the Jews already in Palestine was still possible.116 
And they thought mass immigration to Palestine would spell the destruction of that 
shared existence. 
  For a variety of reasons related to US politics, including Truman’s terror “of 
incurring the ill-will of the very powerful Zionist lobby and of its loyal blocs of voters 
in key states,’” the President was focused on the displaced Jews as the singular, 
prioritized problem, which was to be solved through realization of Zionist goals.117 
On the heels of the Anglo-American Committee report, Truman called for the 
admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. Soon thereafter the state of Israel was 
established, and some 750,000 Palestinian Arab refugees were dispossessed of their 
homeland.  
 The Arab Office that Albert Hourani worked with was staffed by self-
described “decent, liberal, approachable people,” as Albert’s brother and director of 
the Washington branch of the Arab Office (between 1946-1948), Cecil Hourani, told 
me in an interview. But Hourani and his team had violated the “conventions of 
sympathy,” a feature of political discourse about Jews in World War II that was 
entrenched by that time.118 Although Palestinians argued that sympathy for the Jews 
should not come at the expense of their national rights, it was the former that won out. 
Ultimately, the affective conventions of the day recognized only one set of sentiments 
as justifying territorial rights, in the process subordinating Arab political claims to 
Jewish ones. 
 Similar to what Ann Stoler has discovered in the Dutch colonial archives, 
rulers in Palestine have also been preoccupied with appraisals of affect.119 The 
unequal value that these statesmen have given to emotion, ideology, and reason in 
assessments of Palestinians has been changeable, if not capricious. While Arabs were 
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faced with skepticism about the sincerity of their nationalist sentiment during the 
King-Crane Commission, they were discounted for their lack of sympathy during the 
Anglo-American Commission. Unearthing these systems of thought and feeling 
reveals that the judgment of evidence is always, and has always been, as much a 
process of “affective discernment” as it was an evaluation of supposedly “objective” 
fact.120  
 
THE MITCHELL COMMISSION, 2001 
 The Mitchell Commission, my last case, provides a final telling example of 
the changing role of affect in the international community’s ways of understanding—
and governing—the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It raises questions about how (and 
whether) Palestinians can meet the ever mutating and unspoken criteria of political 
judgment and the shifting place of emotions within it. These historical shifts show 
how emotion and reasoned, factual discourse are accepted as evidence in ambivalent, 
if not contradictory ways. 
 The Mitchell Commission, officially the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding 
Committee, released its report on April 30th, 2001, about six months after then US 
President Clinton called for it at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at 
Sharm el-Sheikh, the purpose of which was to “end the violence, to prevent its 
recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process.”121 Dispatched just about a 
month after the second Palestinian intifada began, it was not to be “a tribunal but [a 
committee] to find out what happened and prevent recurrence.”122  
 The investigation involved the gathering of, on the one hand, technical and 
legal evidence, and on the other hand, hearing personal stories of violence and 
victimhood. Throughout their political history, Palestinians’ efforts to inform and 
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convince through the accumulation of material evidence fell short of commissioners’ 
affective expectations until the Mitchell Commission, when Palestinian 
responsiveness to that demand was heightened. This more recent commission exhibits 
a widened focus on the suffering and testimony of individual victims, and also shows 
how the Palestinian understanding of the commission differed in some marked ways 
from that of the investigators.  
 One key person on the Palestinian legal team that was responsible for 
producing the written submissions and guiding the Committee in the West Bank 
understood that the approach to presenting their case was legal. Another team member 
likened it to “a civil law case.” He said they organized the ballistics, the maps, the 
numbers of settlements, as if they were “presenting the evidence to the judge.” And as 
another understood it, the law was “very much seen as a genuine part of the 
Palestinian narrative. So by using the law, we were using tools and terms that were at 
least familiar to the Palestinian leadership. It’s in keeping with the traditional way 
Palestinians have done things.”  
 In interviews with me, American staff of the Mitchell Commission talked 
about the evidence they received as existing on a spectrum from “the rational to the 
emotional.” Ultimately, for them it was the form of the presentation that did as much 
work—and left more of an impression—as the substance of what Palestinians said 
and argued. In preparing their reports for the Commission, the Palestinian team “spent 
tons of time trying to actually find out the details; who was killed, the names of the 
people who were killed. Because we did not want to be attacked on bad data,” as one 
of the Palestinian lawyers recalled. But the commission received the Palestinians’ 
painstaking legal submissions in a pro-forma way.123 Even though what the 
Palestinians thought they were doing was making sure that “all the evidence [was] on 
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the table,” presenting the commission “with as much data, facts, and first hand 
evidence as possible,” the Commission staff did not pour through the evidence. As 
one of the investigative team told me, he “took [written] submissions with a grain of 
salt” since he “knew what could be expected” out of both parties. Instead of focusing 
on this “cold dry paper,” one of the American staff said, “we needed to understand … 
to walk in their shoes.”  
 The Palestinians organizing their field visits sought to allow the investigators 
to do just this. The new focus on the suffering of Palestinian victims marked a change 
from earlier inquiries. The Palestinian staff sought to “bring home” to the 
investigators experiences of occupation and violence; to give them a “physical sense” 
of it, as one told me. “When [the Committee] came on the ground [in Palestine], we 
made sure that they went to the hospital that was bombed and met the families of the 
people that were bombed or imprisoned… you have the [written] submission, which 
is solid law, then you have the facts, then tear jerkers.” But none of the Palestinian 
staff considered these personal stories to be the main focus of their presentation to the 
Committee.  
 Although foregrounding this emotional dimension was not key to the strategy 
of the Palestinian lawyers, it ultimately was the testimony and emotional impact of 
non-professional, non-politicians that the Mitchell staff perceived to be most 
authentic, and that convinced them the most. What the Americans recalled twelve 
years later when they spoke to me were these shared experiences: seeing the large 
bullet hole from Israeli fire in a little Palestinian girl’s bedroom, receiving a bag-full 
of shells from distressed parents. They remembered moments of emotional 
recognition and understanding they shared with both the Israelis and the Palestinians.  
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 These were moments of what Lauren Berlant calls “sentimentality… when 
emotions communicate authenticity that enables identification and solidarity among 
strangers.”124 As an American staffer said, “It didn’t seem like you were talking to a 
professional communicator who has an agenda. These are people who had families 
and shops and this is what they had experienced.” Relying on their “affective 
discernment”,125 the commission staff put their faith in the apolitical, personal stories. 
Not Hanan Ashrawi’s reasoned discourse about the history of the occupation, not the 
speech about democracy by a populist street leader, and not the requirements of 
international law presented in the Palestinians’ legalistic, written submissions. In the 
end, what persuaded the Americans most was the evidence gathered in another 
register: the empathy-inducing interactions with “regular” people.  
 The commission staff told me that they were from the beginning concerned 
with keeping the investigation as “objective” as possible. And the Palestinian staff 
who interacted with them believed them to be “genuine.” “They took their job 
seriously,” as one said. Another said he was surprised at how “open minded” and 
“objective” they turned out to be. This attempt at a balanced approach was evident in 
the report of the Mitchell Commission. There are multiple references to “both sides,” 
and to the different “perspectives” of the PLO and the Government of Israel. The 
report was also highly attuned to the emotional scene of the second intifada. It 
acknowledged the “humiliation and frustration” that the Palestinians experience under 
occupation; it sought ways to reduce the hostility and mistrust between the parties; it 
worried about hatred, and about the Israelis’ fear; it recognized anger on “both sides.” 
Whereas the Palestinian lawyers who organized the presentations to the Mitchell 
investigators focused on using law as a way to produce “an easily digestible narrative 
from the Palestinian side,” the fact-finders heard the suffering and grief of 
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Palestinians and Israelis, and were, in the words of the report, “touched by their 
stories.”126 As political analyst Mouin Rabbani stated in his critique of the Mitchell 
report, it gives the impression that “the Committee was investigating a confrontation 
between equal forces, each equally responsible for the ‘violence.’” 127 And in the end, 
the turn to emotion as the authenticating ground of proof resulted in a false 
equivalence between Palestinian and Jewish experiences, even if in this commission 
there was more sympathy for the Palestinians’ feelings and frustrations.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Each of these three investigative commissions into the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, like many others over the past century, have offered languages of political 
legitimacy and legitimization for Palestinians to appropriate, maneuver within, and 
present arguments through.128 All were invitations to prove political worthiness. 
Palestinians demonstrated in the very form of their interactions with successive 
commissions “appropriate” political subjectivities: nationally coherent, 
democratically principled, law abiding, rights demanding, suffering.  
 Commissions in general often hold up the promise of reasonableness in 
policy-making; they invite concerned parties into public discussion to prove 
themselves reasonable political subjects, and promise to rationally consider their 
interests and make judgments based on evidence. With one hand commissions offer 
this hope, while with the other their reports are put in a drawer and forgotten. They 
often have no discernable effect on political outcomes, since the governments that 
send them often have pre-existing political goals that shape the investigations and 
how their recommendations are taken up or, more often, ignored. My argument here 
is that the effects of these commissions have worked in a different register. They have 
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misled Palestinians into believing that decisions would be based on the evidence 
Palestinians presented, and that their reasoned arguments were being considered 
according to rational criteria.  
Commissions are themselves a method of persuading Palestinians and others 
that dialogue and civility are the means to the resolution of the conflict, and that 
international management of the conflict is happening on a firm basis of objective 
fact. In so doing, they have shaped a false sense of what “’the emotional economy’ of 
empire” is.129 Despite the investigative experts’ stated commitment to reason as a 
modality of both claims-making and evaluation, emotion is never edited out, and is 
often central. Claims about affect, and experts’ claims to be able to judge affect—to 
know interior states, feelings, and true intentions—are themselves politically 
powerful. They justify some people in their role as expert and validate their policy 
recommendations. That the enactment and analysis of emotion has been such a 
significant scaffold for gathering proof and evaluating Palestinian claims illuminates 
the wider emotional economy of imperialism and how it encourages Palestinians into 
particular performances.130 
 The turn towards emotion as the evidentiary ground of testimony has been 
increasingly explicit over the course of the three commissions, as the international 
context and international governance structures changed over this period—beginning 
in the Wilsonian era of the League of Nations when westerns were concerned with the 
protection of minorities, through the United Nations and the instantiation of human 
rights as a hegemonic legal and moral political language, to American dominance 
internationally and as “peace broker” for the conflict. Throughout, Palestinians have 
persistently called on democratic principles, demonstrated national coherence, and 
stressed the injustice of foreign usurpation of their homeland, always using logical 
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and reasoned arguments. But reading affect has always been key to how the 
commissions carried out investigations, always present in how the conflict has been 
managed and evaluated.  
 Who was to speak for the Palestinians has also varied since the Mandate 
period, when religious leaders and “notable” families were prominent. More space has 
opened for the voice of the intelligentsia, academics, technocrats and legal 
practitioners, with increasing attention to “ordinary” people and NGO workers as the 
human rights regime has came to frame Palestinian political appeals.131 The changes 
reflect international political dynamics, as a global moral order (or at least a pretense 
to one) came to be embodied in the human rights and humanitarian system privileging 
not just international human rights and humanitarian law, but also the testimony of the 
violated, especially since the 1970s.132 While the specific demands and “key words” 
of these political appeals have changed, reasoned and evidence-based presentations 
have remained a consistent form in which Palestinians have presented their demands. 
 Although commissioners have claimed to valorize reasoned argument as 
preferred political method, and to operate with objectivity and reasoned fairness, they 
have never privileged reasoned argument alone. Contrary to the dominant claims of 
western political discourse, claims that are sometimes taken at face value in the 
counter-histories of social theory found in the “affective turn,” reasoned argument has 
never been the only currency of the normative democratic public sphere.133 What the 
Palestinian experience points to for social theory, then, is the need to inquire more 
into the social, governmental, and political institutions that simultaneously have made 
affective states indices of political legitimacy and obscured their significance. What 
we need to understand is not just affect as a part of colonial subjugation or politics 
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generally, but how and why the powerful role of determining and defining correct 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Amahl Bishara, Fabio Gygi, Marloes Janson, 
Karim Makdisi, David Mosse, Juan Obarrio, Caroline Osella, Paru Raman, Kostas 
Retsikas, Yezid Sayigh, Ajantha Subramanian, and participants at the Issam Fares 
Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs - American University of Beirut, 
the Johns Hopkins Department of Anthropology seminars, and The Mashriq in the 
Age of Late Imperialism workshop at Princeton University. I especially thank the 
CSSH reviewers for their astute comments on earlier versions of this article, and the 
editors of this journal. 
1 For a summary of the King Crane Commission, see 
http://www.oberlin.edu/library/digital/king-crane/intro.html, accessed May 23, 2015. 
American Commission to Negotiate Peace, “Future Administration of Certain 
Portions of the Turkish Empire under the Mandatory System (Secret).” 25 March, 
1919.  Oberlin College Archives, Group 2/6-Henry C. King, King-Crane 
Commission, Reports and Correspondence, Box # 128.  Subsequently cited as “King-
Crane Commission Archives.” 
2 The King-Crane Commission Report, August 28, 1919. Available at: 
http://www.hri.org/docs/king-crane/syria.html#statement. Subsequently cited as 
“King-Crane Commission Report.” 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   35	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The monarch they chose was Emir Feisal, who had helped establish an Arab 
government under British protection after they conquered the Ottoman army. Feisal, 
emissary to the Paris Peace Conference, returned to Damascus in May 1919 to greet 
the King-Crane Commission. 
4 “’Ala abwab al-imtihan,” [At the door of the examination] Al-Asima, June 25, 1919, 
1. 
5 The Commission report noted that “the feeling against the Zionist programme is not 
confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria,” with 
a large majority of the petitions “directed against the Zionist programme.” “King-
Crane Commission Report.” 
6 Box 16/2 (King-Crane Commission, May-August 1919), Albert H. Lybyer Papers, 
1876-1949, Oberlin College Repository, University Archives, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign (hereafter, ALP/OCR) 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/kingcrane/id/1840, accessed 
July 3, 2013.  
7 Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle 
East (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), 44. 
8 John L. Comaroff, “Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and 
Elsewhere: Factions, Fragments, Facts and Fictions,” Social Identities 4, 3 (1998), 
321-361. 
9 See, for example, Adam Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-
Century South Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Radhika V. Mongia, 
“Impartial Regimes of Truth,” Cultural Studies, 18, 5 (2004), 749-768; Ann Laura 
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10 James W. Fernandez, “Anthropological Inquiry into the Force of the Emotions in 
the Family of Man: An Overview,” Endoxa 33 (2014), 13-36; Edward Said, 
Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).  
11 For example, the Palestinian decision to focus on the Mitchell Committee only 
happened after it became clear that the Taba peace talks were not leading anywhere. 
12 Israel has never cooperated with the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of 
the Occupied Territories, the 2002 UN Security Council-mandated investigation into 
Israeli attacks on Jenin refugee camp, the 2009 Goldstone Commission, or the UN 
investigation into the attacks on Gaza in 2014. It severed ties with the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2012 when the Council probed illegal West Bank settlements, and 
refused to appear before it in the Universal Periodic Review in 2013. And since 2007 
Israel has refused to allow access to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory by all 
Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories. 
https://www.badil.org/en/press-releases/146-2014/4362-press-eng-30.  Israel also 
regularly refuses to carry out its own investigations of IDF soldiers killing civilians. 
Human Rights Watch, “Promoting Impunity,” 2005, Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/iopt0605/5.htm, accessed May 23, 2015. 
13 Key works on the settler-colonial history and present of Israel include: Maxine 
Rodinson, Israel: A Colonial Settlers State? (New York: Pathfinder, 1973); Rashid 
Khalidi, “The Colonial Foundations of Israel,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 3, 4 
(1974); Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage, 1992); Gershon 
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Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, 4 (2006), 287–409.  
14 Dominic Boyer, “Thinking Through the Anthropology of Experts,” Anthropology 
in Action 15, 2 (2008), 45. 
15 Sources for my analysis include archival research and ethnographic interviews with 
those involved in investigative commissions, as well as secondary sources on each 
historical period. Through the use of memoirs, personal papers, and interviews, I have 
sought perspectives of individual Palestinians involved with each commission, and of 
the commissioners and governments that dispatched them, along with the broader 
public’s reactions to the commissions and their reports. 
 16 Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social 
Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival 
Science 2 (2002), 102. 
17 Other British Royal commissions include: the Palin Commission (1920) that 
investigated the 1920 riots during the Nebi Musa festival; the Haycraft Commission 
(1921), an investigation into the causes of the 1921 Jaffa Riots; the Shaw 
Commission, a British Parliamentary commission investigating the Western (Wailing) 
Wall riots in 1929; and the Woodhead Commission (1938), established in response to 
opposition voices (especially Churchill) demanding re-examination of partition 
proposals. The League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission was established 
in 1921 and constituted a forum in which Jews and Arabs sought to make political 
claims, often in terms of international law. See Natasha Wheatley, “Mandatory 
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missions,” panels of inquiry, and Special Rapporteurs. A recent UN inquiry 
commission on Palestine investigated the “Gaza Conflict,” and released its report on 
22 June 2015. UNHRC, (24 June 2015), UN Doc A/HRC/29/CRP.4. Other 
investigations include the 2010 Palmer Committee, and independent initiatives 
including the 1982 MacBride Commission, and the ‘Public Truth Commission’ 
organized by the Israeli NGO Zochrot. 
18 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are a distinct form of commission. 
They emphasize political reconciliation, usually within a nation-state and at the 
perceived endpoint of a conflict. Because the contexts, purposes, and results of TRCs 
are so divergent, I do not incorporate explicit comparison between them and the 
Palestinian cases in my analysis, but critical analyses of TRCs inform my approach. 
See the special issue edited by Greg Grandin and Thomas Miller Klubock, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions: State Terror, History and Memory, Radical History 
Review 2007, 97 (2007) and Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
19 Michael Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics,” Public Culture 14, 1 (2002), 50. 
20 Bruno Latour uses the concept of “political epistemology” to draw attention to the 
unstable boundary between politics and science. See Bruno Latour “Review Essay: 
The Netz-Works of Greek Deductions,” Social Studies of Science 38 (2008), 441–59; 
Duncan Kennedy, “Knowledge and the Political: Bruno Latour's Political 
Epistemology,” Cultural Critique 74, 1 (2010), 83-97. I use the notion somewhat 
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differently, in that I accept that some frameworks for interaction (such as investigative 
commissions and government lobbying) are explicitly political and popularly 
recognized as such, and then seek to understand what counts as knowledge and fact 
within a political context. For a parallel kind of approach to epistemology, see 
Andreas Glaeser, “Power/Knowledge Failure: Epistemic Practices and Ideologies in 
the Secret Police of Former East Germany,” Social Analysis 47, 1 (2003), 10-26. 
21 A similar point is made in Beng-Huat Chua, “Democracy as Textual 
Accomplishment,” The Sociological Quarterly 20, 4 (1979), 543. For examples, see 
Hugh Davis Graham, “The Ambiguous Legacy of American Presidential 
Commissions,” The Public Historian 7, 2 (1985), 8, 18; also Hugh Davis Graham, 
“On Riots and Riot Commissions: Civil Disorders in the 1960’s,” The Public 
Historian 2, 4, (1980), 14. 
22 Ivor Richardson, “F W Guest Memorial Lecture 1989 Commissions of Inquiry,”  
Otago Law Review 7,1. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189704, accessed May 23, 2015; 
Information on the Domesday Book is available at 
http://www.domesdaybook.co.uk/index.html, accessed May 23, 2015. 
23 For example, see Jonathan Beck, “Head of UN Gaza Commission Rejects Claims 
of Bias,” The Times of Israel, June 22, 2015, available at: 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/head-of-un-gaza-commission-rejects-claims-of-bias/,  
accessed June 29, 2015; and “The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
Statement,” which asserts that it is “independent and free from any interference.” 
Available at http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/4499, accessed May 23, 2015. 
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Legal History,” Statute Law Review 31, 1 (2010), 24. 
26 For example, see Rob Grace, “Impartiality and the Bahrain Commission,” ATHA 
(2011). Available at: http://www.atha.se/content/impartiality-and-bahrain-
commission, accessed May 26, 2015; Arthur Lenk, “Fact-Finding as a Peace 
Negotiation Tool—The Mitchell Report and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” 
Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 24, 289 (2002).  
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol24/iss3/1; Cherif Bassiouni,  
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Permanent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 10, 11 
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Articulation of Political Anti-Zionism,” American Jewish Archives 29, 1 (1977), 22-
53. Patrick traces the after-life of the Commission. Andrew Patrick, “Reading the 
King-Crane Commission of 1919: Discourses of Race, Modernity, and Self-
Determination in Competing American Visions for the Post-Ottoman Middle East” 
(PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2011).  
28 See for example Asher Maoz, “Historical Adjudication: Courts of Law, 
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This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   41	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Darryl Li, “Lies, Damned Lies and Plagiarizing ‘Experts,’” Middle East Research 
and Information Project 41 (2011). Available at: 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer260/lies-damn-lies-plagiarizing-experts, accessed April 
3, 2016; Fred Block and Margaret Somers, “In the Shadow of Speenhamland: Social 
Policy and the Old Poor Law,” Politics & Society 31, 2 (2003), 283-323 
30 Michael Lynch and David Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text and 
Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings. (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 
1996), 89, 238.  
31 Chua, “Democracy as Textual Accomplishment,” 543; Graham, “On Riots and Riot 
Commissions,” 21; Muhammad Fādil al-Jamālī, Memoirs and Lessons (Beirut: Dar 
al-katib al-jadid, 1964), 78 (in Arabic). 
32 Ashforth, The Politics; Michael Gilsenan, Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence 
and Narrative in an Arab Society (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers 1996), 69-78; 
Mongia, “Impartial Regimes of Truth;” Stoler, Along the Archival. 
33 Ashforth, The Politics, 4; Stoler, Along the Archival, 27; Jane Cowan, “Who’s 
Afraid of Violent Language? Honour, Sovereignty and Claims-Making in the League 
of Nations,” Anthropological Theory 33, 3 (2003), 271–291; “The Supervised State,” 
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 14, 5 (2007), 545-578; “Fixing 
National Subjects in the 1920s Southern Balkans: Also an International Practice,” 
American Ethnologist 35, 2 (2008), 338-356. 
34 Especially Ashforth, The Politics.. 
35 In her study on the role of sympathy in imperial state-building, Danilyn Rutherford 
has noted the dearth of focus on “the real-time interactions between officials and their 
subjects that make up colonial practice,” but her emphasis is still on the political work 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of feeling among colonial rulers rather than the ruled. Danilyn Rutherford, 
“Sympathy, State Building, and the Experience of Empire,” Cultural Anthropology 
24, 1 (2009), 4. 
 36 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International 
Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23. 
37 Ussama Makdisi, Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 
1820-2001 (New York: Public Affairs/ Perseus Books, 2010), 125. The King-Crane 
Commission Report also notes that “President Wilson's Fourteen Points, had made a 
deep impression upon the Syrian people and lay in the background of all their 
demands.” 
38 Akram Zu’aytir, “Protest to Wilson, 15 March 1919 from Palestinian Colony of San 
Salvador,” Watha’iq al-haraka al-wataniyya al-filastiniyya 1918-1039. Min awraq 
Akram Zu’aytir (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), 10. Western politicians 
also recognized the importance of invoking Wilson: “Many Allied officials felt, as 
Walter Lippmann noted, that before beginning a foreign policy statement they had to 
take a kind of immunity oath by prefacing their remarks with a pledge to Wilson’s 
ideas.” Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary 
Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1971), 121. 
39 “The Committee to Haifa, Akka, and the End of the Journey,” Watha’iq al-haraka, 
2. 
40  George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab Awakening (New 
York: Capricorn Books, 1965 [1946]), 287. 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   43	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Hilu Bulus, “Al-mas’ala al-suriyya,” al-Muqattam July 9, 1919, 2; ‘Aisa Suqary, 
“Al-lejna al-dowliyya fi filastin,” Al-Muqattam June 20, 1919; “Al-lejna al-dowliyya 
fi yafa,” (authors unknown) Al-Muqattam, 23 June 1919; Makdisi, Faith Misplaced, 
144, f.n. 66. 
42 Zu’aytir, Watha’iq al-haraka, 2.  They were perhaps unaware of how little Wilson 
and his deputies were concerned with territories outside Europe. Manela, The 
Wilsonian Moment, 24, 40-41. Wilson had already privately approved a draft of 
Balfour’s pro-Zionist statement. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the 
Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 75.  
43 “Interviews of the King-Crane Commission in the corners of Palestine and East 
Jordan, June 1919.” Zu’aytir, Watha’iq al-haraka, 29. 
44 Wilson advocated the creation of a new league of nations to facilitate a global 
moral commitment to peace through rational discourse to mobilize public opinion. 
Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Wilson Woodrow Wilson, Alliances, and the League of 
Nations,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 5, 2 (2006), 139-165. 
45 Patrick, Reading the King-Crane, 27; “Interviews,” Watha’iq al-haraka, 23-24. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Saida Hodzic, “Ascertaining Deadly Harms: Aesthetics and Politics of Global 
Evidence,” Cultural Anthropology 28, 1 (2013), 90; Marilyn Strathern, Partial 
Connections (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 1991), 10. 
48 In addition, the commissioners carried with them a reading list that included 
ethnographic history books, some written by Christian missionaries to the Near East, 
as well as “statistical and economic data,” maps of physical features of the land, 
political boundaries, and information on the political situation “showing as accurately 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   44	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as possible” present claims of groups. “King-Crane Commission (May-August 
1919),” box 16/1 ALP/OCR, 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/kingcrane/id/1840, accessed 
July 3, 2013.  
49 They conceded that in Palestine they saw proportionally far more Christian groups. 
Of the nine members of the Commission, seven had ties to Christian missionary 
activity in the Near East, and three were preachers themselves. Grabill, Protestant 
Diplomacy. 
50 The fear of the Arab mob, and colonial tendencies to blame the Arab mob as 
collective perpetrator extends throughout history. See Gregory Starrett, 
“Authentication and Affect: Why the Turks Don't Like Enchanted Counterpublics, A 
Review Essay,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, 4 (2008), 1036–1046.  
The Peel Commission attributes the 1936 disturbances in Jaffa to an Arab mob 
(Ch.IV, p.96). In more recent times it is referred to as “the Arab street.” See Asef 
Bayat, “The ‘Street’ and the Politics of Dissent in the Arab World,” Middle East 
Report, 226 (2003), 10-17. 
51  Howard, The King-Crane Commission, 121. 
52 In James Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the 
Close of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 263. 
53 Ibid., 264. 
54 Ibid., 20. 
55 “’Ala abwab al-imtihan,” Al-Asima, June 25, 1919, 1.  
56 “An Analysis of the Syrian-Palestine Situation in 1919: The American Point of 
View,” 1928, box7/1, William Yale Papers, Boston University (hereafter, WYP/BU). 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   45	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57The League of Nations Charter is available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22 
58 Article 22 had been well publicized and shaped Palestinian claims to the League of 
Nations. William Yale, “Thesis submitted in part requirement of Master’s degree by 
William Yale. 1928. Title: An analysis of the Syrian-Palestine Situation in 1919 The 
American Point of View,” box 7/1/6, WYP/BU. Natasha Wheatley, The Mandate 
System as a Style of Reasoning: International Jurisdiction and the Parceling of 
Imperial Sovereignty in Petitions from Palestine. In The Routledge Handbook of the 
History of the Middle East Mandates. Ed. Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan (Oxon 
and New York: Routledge, 2015), 109. 
59 Khalil al-Sakakini, Yawmiyyat Khalil al-Sakakini, Vol. 3: Ikhtibar Al-Intidab w 
As’ilat Al-Hawiyya 1919-1922, ed. Akram Musallam (Ramallah: Khalil Sakakini 
Cultural Centre, and Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2004), 175. 
60 “The Principles of the Mandatory regime.” Available at: 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C61B138F4DBB08A0052565D00058EE1B. 
Accessed May 29, 2015. 
61 Zu’aytir, Watha’iq al-haraka, 29. 
62 Cited in James Gelvin, The Ironic Legacy of the King-Crane Commission. In The 
Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment. 2d ed. 
Ed. David W. Lesch (Oxford: Westview Press, 2012), 20, f.n.23.  
63 The note on this “protest from Muslims and Christians of Nablus to the Paris Peace 
Conference and allied states” states that this protest signed by all these people forms 
the credible popular opinion officially from the Nablus municipality. Zu’aytir, 
Watha’iq al-haraka, 12.  
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   46	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 “Historical sketch by Albert H. Lybyer of the Commission’s visit to Syria, 1 
August 1919. Report by Albert Lybyer providing a narrative description of the King-
Crane Commission’s visit to different parts of the Levant,” box 16/1, ALP/OCR. 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/kingcrane/id/2563, 
accessed April 25, 2014. 
65 Zu’aytir, Watha’iq al-haraka, 7. 
66 “An Analysis,” box 7/1/6-7, WYP/BU. 
67 “Strong National Feeling,” ALP/OCR; Montgomery was also concerned with 
“Syrian national feeling.” “Report by George Montgomery on Zionism, 1 July 1919” 
box 16/1, ALP/OCR. Available at: 
http://dcollections.oberlin.edu/cdm/ref/collection/kingcrane/id/2300. 
68 “Recommendations of the Future of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon,” July 26, 1919, 
William Yale Collection, Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, box 
1/4/6. 
69  “Report in detail of Interviews in London (Sept. 27, 1919 to Oct. 14, 1919),” box 
5/4, WYP/BU. 
70 “Reflections on Syrian Nationalism,” box 5/3/319, WYP/BU; William Yale, The 
Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), 
192. 
71 “Reflections on Syrian Nationalism,” box 5/3/319, WYP/BU. 
72 William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, [1958]1968), 4. 
73 Report by George Montgomery on Syria, 1 August 1919 Box 16/2, ALP/OCR. 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   47	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Yale’s minority report is mentioned in Knee, “The King-Crane Commission,” 44; 
Patrick, “Reading the King-Crane Commission,” 25. 
75 Compare Rutherford, “Sympathy,” 9.  
76 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement: Written from his 
Unpublished and Personal Material, Vol. II (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
Page & Co.,1923), 208.  
77 Cowan, “Who’s Afraid of Violent Language?” 
 78 Ghassan Hage, “Hating Israel in the Field: On Ethnography and Political 
Emotions,” Anthropological Theory, 9 (2009), 59–79; Catherine Lutz, “The 
Anthropology of Emotions,” Annual Review of Anthropology 15 (1986), 405-436;   
 Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds., Language and the Politics of Emotion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Michelle Rosaldo, “Toward an 
Anthropology of Self and Feeling,” in Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and 
Emotion. R. Shweder and R. Levine, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 137-57. 
 79 Steve Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon”: Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North 
Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Deborah Gould, 
Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP’s Fight Against AIDS (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009); Thomas Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the 
Humanitarian Sensibility,” Parts 1-2, American Historical Review 90, 2-3 (1985), 
339-361; 547-566; Yael Navaro-Yashin, The Make-Believe Space: Affective 
Geography in a Postwar Polity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). 
 80 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 
Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1977] 2013); 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   48	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Martijn Konings, The Emotional Logic of Capitalism: What Progressives Have 
Missed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Death 
Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
81 Paul Manning, “Owning and Belonging: A Semiotic Investigation of the Affective 
Categories of a Bourgeois Society,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 46 
(2004), 300-325; William Mazzarella, “Affect: What is it Good for?” in 
Enchantments of Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization, ed. Saurab Dhube 
(London: Routledge, 2008); William Mazzarella, “A Torn Performative Dispensation: 
The Affective Politics of British Second World War Propaganda in India and the 
Problem of Legitimation in an Age of Mass Publics,” South Asian History and 
Culture, 1, 1 (2010), 1- 24; Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007); Kabir Tambar, “Iterations of Lament: Anachronism and 
Affect in a Shi‘i Islamic Revival in Turkey,” American Ethnologist, 38, 3 (2011), 
484-500. 
82Adela Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 101. 
83 Andrew Beatty, “Current Emotion Research in Anthropology: Reporting the Field,” 
Emotion Review 5, 4 (2013), 420. 
84 Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry, 37, 3 (2011), 434-
472; Nigel Thrift, “Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect,” 
Geografiska Annaler 86 (2004), 58. 
85 Patricia Ticineto Clough, Introduction, in The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 1-33. 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   49	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Ben Anderson, “Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect,” 
Environment and Planning D, 24 (2006), 738. 
87 Athena Athanasiou, Pothiti Hantzaroula, Kostas Yannakopoulos, “Towards a New 
Epistemology: The ‘Affective Turn,’” Historein 8, (2008), 5-16. 
88 Affect is the realm in which political actors can engage in a “politics of 
immediation” through which privileged access to reality or truth can be asserted. For 
related discussions, see Lori Allen, “Martyr Bodies in the Media: Human Rights, 
Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the Palestinian Intifada,” American 
Ethnologist, 36, 1 (2009), 162-163; Mazzarella, “A Torn Performative,” 2010.  
89 Box 4/2, WYP/BU. 
90 William Yale Collection, University of New Hampshire, Box 2, MC21/ 
11/3 (hereafter WYC/UNH); also Howard, The King-Crane Commission, 70-71. 
91 For an exegesis of how reading and measuring emotion has figured in the history of 
colonial counterinsurgency, see Laleh Khalili, “The Uses of Happiness in 
Counterinsurgencies,” Social Text 118, 32, 1 (2014), 23-43. 
92 “Strong National Feeling,” ALP/OCR. 
93 For parallel dynamics in recent Palestinian politics, see Lori Allen, “Sincerity, 
Hypocrisy, and Conspiracy Theory in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Forthcoming, October. 
94 Leys, “The Turn,” 436, 437. 
95 On misreading the emotional terrain of diplomatic interactions, see Winifred Tate, 
“Proxy Citizenship and Transnational Advocacy: Colombian Activists from 
Putumayo to Washington, DC,” American Ethnologist  40, 1 (2013), 55-70; “Human 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   50	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rights Law and Military Aid Delivery,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology 
Review 34, 2 (2011), 337-354.  
96 Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East: 1945-1951: Arab 
Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,  
1984), 388. 
97 Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 73.  
98 Louis, The British Empire, 420. 
99 Peter Redfield and Erica Bornstein, An Introduction to the Anthropology of 
Humanitarianism. In Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism Between Ethics and 
Politics. Eds. Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield (Santa Fe: School for Advanced 
Research Press, 2010), 17. 
100 Arab Office, The Future of Palestine (London: The Arab Office, 1947), 70. 
101 Rosemary Sayigh, ed. Yusif Sayigh, Arab Economist, Palestinian Patriot: A 
Fractured Life Story (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2015), 188. 
102  Ibid. Also see, Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2d Ed. 
(Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 2009), 177. 
103 Sayigh, Yusif Sayigh, 188. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 84-85. 
106 Ibid., 76. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Interview with Walid Khalidi, 2013. 
109 Stoler, Along the Archival, 40. 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   51	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 76. 
111 Ibid. 
112 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin also agreed with this point. Louis, The 
British Empire, 4.  
113 Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 80. 
114 Walid Khalidi, ed., “The Case against a Jewish State in Palestine: Albert Hourani's 
Statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry of 1946,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 35, 1, (2005), 85. 
115 “Memorandum of The Institute of Arab American Affairs on The 
Recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.” (New York: The 
Institute of Arab American Affairs, 1946), 8. 
116 Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in 
Palestine, 1906-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 274, 322-323. 
117 Louis, The British Empire, 387; also see William A. Eddy, “F.D.R. Meets Ibn 
Saud: The Conference and its Anticlimax, 1945,” in From Haven to Conquest, ed. 
Walid Khalidi, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1971), 512. 
 118 Deborah Nelson, “Suffering and Thinking: The Scandal of Tone in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem,” in Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion. Lauren Berlant, 
ed. London: Routledge, 2004), 220. 
119 Stoler, “Affective States.” 
120 Later examples are found in Lori Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: 
Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2013). 
121 The report is available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm.  
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   52	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The Mitchell Commission’s final report highlighted the importance of rebuilding 
confidence between Palestinians and Israelis, resuming negotiations, for Palestinians 
to end terror and Israelis to freeze settlements. 
123 The Palestinians’ submissions were prepared by the staff of the Negotiation 
Support Unit, a group of mostly relatively young lawyers, most of whom were 
Palestinian, Palestinian-American and others of Arab background or heritage. One of 
them called it “the one centerpiece of Palestinian diplomacy.” The three written 




 124 Sina Najafi, et al. “The Broken Circuit: An Interview with Lauren Berlant,” 
Cabinet Magazine. Available at: 
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/31/najafi_serlin.php.  
125 Najafi, et. al. “The Broken Circuit.” 
126 Although the official PLO response to the Report (available at: http://www.al-
bab.com/arab/docs/pal/mitchell3.htm) noted that it did not fully address all of their 
concerns, they confirmed its “balanced assessment of the facts” and supported the 
implementation of the Committee’s recommendations.  
127 Mouin Rabbani, “The Mitchell Report: Oslo's Last Gasp?” Middle East Report 
Online, 1 June 2001. Available at:  http://www.merip.org/mero/mero060101.  
128 See Wheatley, “Mandatory Interpretation,” 221. 
129 Stoler, Along the Archival, 68. 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   53	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 In both the Palestinian case and that of the Australian aboriginals as analyzed by 
Elizabeth Povinelli it is evident that the less powerful try to make themselves legible 
to those in control of resources. Povinelli argues that the colonial state has compelled 
subaltern subjects to “identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-
identity,” inspiring in them “impossible desires.” Somewhat similarly, the “cunning” 
of commissions reinforces a false message of what are the political criteria according 
to which the colonized are being judged. But commissions do not skew Palestinians’ 
subjectivity or their political aims. Palestinians have been demanding independence 
consistently and for a long time; upholding democratic principles is not simply a 
disciplining imposition from above. There are similar effects, however, in that 
commissions may enable the continuity of colonial settler practices by reducing the 
efficacy of Palestinian resistance to them. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “The Cunning of 
Recognition: A Reply to John Frow and Meaghan Morris,” Critical Inquiry 25, 3 
(1999), 633. 
131 On sociological changes in the Palestinian leadership, see Jamil Hilal, “West Bank 
and Gaza Strip Social Formation under Jordanian and Egyptian Rule (1948–1967),” 
Review of Middle East Studies 5 (1992), 52; The Formation of the Palestinian Elite: 
From the Palestinian National Movement to the Rise of the Palestinian Authority 
(Ramallah: Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2002). 
132 Didier Fassin, “The Humanitarian Politics of Testimony: Subjectification through 
Trauma in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” Cultural Anthropology 23, 3 (2008), 531–
558; Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press, 
2013); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  
published	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐
society-­‐and-­‐history/all-­‐issues	  	  
Accepted	  version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23002/	  	  	  
	  
	   54	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 According to some scholars, in the dominant claims of western political discourse, 
reasoned argument is at the center of the normative democratic public sphere. See 
Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text 25, 26 (1990), 56-80; Jurgen Habermas, 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, Tr. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge MA: 
The M.I.T. Press, 1989). 
 
